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"There Must Be Some 
Misunderstanding": Sir Edward Grey's 
Diplomacy of August 1, 1914 
Stephen J. Valone 
For over two generations, scholars have studied Sir Edward 
Grey's response to the Sarajevo crisis, apparently considering every 
aspect of his dual effort to find a diplomatic solution while convincing 
the cabinet that England must intervene in a general war. Historians 
have generally agreed that Grey's last hope to prevent war evaporated 
by the end of July, although the cabinet did not decide to intervene 
until August 2.1 In this light, the events of August 1, 1914, are only 
considered to be either a prelude or a postscript to more significant 
events. The purpose of this essay is to suggest that Grey pursued two 
distinct, yet interrelated, courses of action on August 1, 1914: (1) for as 
long as he was unsure of cabinet support for intervention, he sought to 
make a diplomatic deal with the German ambassador so that a neutral 
England could salvage something from the crisis, but (2) once confident 
England would enter the conflict, he sought to prevent the war al- 
together by applying diplomatic pressure on France. 
Historians have overlooked Grey's diplomacy on August 1 primar- 
ily because of the cloud cast over the events of the day by the so-called 
misunderstanding between Grey and the German ambassador, Prince 
Karl Max Lichnowsky. The first Grey-Lichnowsky exchange took 
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place that morning when Sir William Tyrrell, Grey's private secretary, 
brought a message to the German embassy. After subsequently receiv- 
ing a personal call from Grey, Lichnowsky, at 11:14 a.m., sent a wire 
to Berlin in which he indicated Grey had proposed that, if Germany 
"were not to attack France, England would remain neutral and would 
guarantee France's passivity."2 Three hours later, after another mes- 
sage from Grey via Tyrrell, Lichnowsky again telegraphed Berlin. He 
reported that now Grey wished to make proposals "for England's neu- 
trality, even in the event of our being at war with both France and 
Russia."3 England was apparently retreating into isolation, leaving 
Germany with a free hand to establish its hegemony over Europe. 
Kaiser Wilhelm II understandably ordered champagne when word of 
the second exchange reached him in Berlin.4 But such elation was 
short-lived. King George responded to the Kaiser's acceptance of 
Grey's first proposal by telegraphing that "there must be some misun- 
derstanding as to a suggestion that passed in friendly conversation 
between Prince Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey this afternoon."5 In 
the subsequent explanations given by Grey and Lichnowsky, both 
diplomats insisted that a "misunderstanding" had occurred. Each main- 
tained that Lichnowsky had not understood that Grey, in his first over- 
ture that morning, had implied that Britain would only remain neutral if 
Germany refrained from attacking either France or Russia.6 
The debate over this exchange has been mostly confined to narrow 
ground: whether or not Lichnowsky misunderstood Grey's intima- 
tions. The interpretation that gained general acceptance in Germany at 
the close of the war held that, on August 1, Grey had not suggested 
British neutrality if Germany did not attack France; rather, Lich- 
nowsky had misunderstood Tyrrell and Grey and had then not cor- 
rected his error with Berlin when he became aware of it. Weimar 
historians were more vituperative in their attacks on Lichnowsky's 
2 Lichnowsky to Jagow, August 1, 1914, Die Deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsaus- 
bruch, 2d ed., 4 vols. (Berlin, 1919), 3, no. 562:66 (cited hereafter as DD3). 
3 Ibid., no. 570, p. 70. 
4 Harry Young, "The Misunderstanding of August 1, 1914," Journal of Modern 
History 48 (December 1976): 650. 5 King George to Kaiser Wilhelm, August 1, 1914, DD3, no. 612, pp. 103-4. 
6 Grey to Bertie, August 1, 1914, in British Documents on the Origins of the War, 
1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperly, 11 vols. (London, 1926-36), 11, no. 
419:250, n. 2 (cited hereafter as BD11). Karl Max Lichnowsky, Heading for the Abyss: 
Reminiscences, trans. and ed. Sefton Delmer (London, New York, 1928), pp. 75-76. 
There is no reference made to the "misunderstanding" in either the Grey or Tyrrell 
papers deposited at the Public Record Office (PRO). See PRO, Foreign Office (FO) 800/ 
35-113, 220. 
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"blunder" because the Allies used his memoirs, which criticized the 
imperial government for having frustrated the efforts at peace, as evi- 
dence that Germany had caused the war of its own free will.7 After 
World War II, Fritz Fischer and his pupil, Imanuel Geiss, continued 
the tradition of treating the exchanges of August 1 as Lichnowsky's 
misunderstanding.8 More recently, Harry Young has written that on 
August 1, Grey attempted to formulate an arret militaire between 
France, Germany, and Russia, but that Lichnowsky failed to include 
Russia in the calculations.9 
Luigi Albertini provided probably the most noted rejection of the 
"misunderstanding thesis." In his Le origini della guerra del 1914, he 
argued that a dull-minded Grey blundered into proposing the abandon- 
ment of Russia through Anglo-French neutrality.?1 Edward Corp por- 
trayed Grey in an even worse light. While agreeing with Albertini that 
no misunderstanding occurred, Corp argued that Tyrrell persuaded 
Grey to allow him to offer English neutrality to Lichnowsky because 
he did not want England to aid Russia; in other words, a private secre- 
tary had convinced the British foreign secretary to offer Germany pro- 
posals which, in Corp's words, "made political and strategic non- 
sense." 11 Thus, the historiography of August 1, 1914, could be reduced 
to a debate between those who say Lichnowsky was deaf and those 
who argue Grey was feebleminded. 
A more satisfying interpretation can be found by assuming that 
Grey knew what he was doing and that Lichnowsky's hearing was 
normal. Hermann Lutz hinted at this alternative in his largely over- 
looked Lord Grey und der Weltkrieg. In this work, he concluded that 
there was no "misunderstanding" on August 1 and that the episode 
7 See Young, pp. 644-45, 660-61, 665. 8 See Imanuel Geiss, ed., Julikrise und Kriegsausbruch, 2 vols. (Hanover, 1964), 
2:530; and Fritz Fischer, Krieg der Illusionen (Dusseldorf, 1969), p. 724. 
9 Young, pp. 663-65. Young placed great stock in the fact that both Grey and 
Lichnowsky, in "independent" accounts of August 1 written later that month, stated 
that Lichnowsky had not understood the inclusion of Russia in a Franco-German stand- 
off. Since the two men met with each other on August 3 and again on August 5, one 
must, however, question the value of these "independent" explanations. It should be 
mentioned that the Grey-Lichnowsky exchanges of August 1 are not discussed by either 
of Grey's principal biographers. See George M. Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon (Boston, 
1937); and Keith Robbins, Sir Edward Grey (London, 1971). 
10 Luigi Albertini, Le origini della guerra del 1914, 3 vols. (Milan, 1942-43), cited 
here in The Origins of the War of 1914, trans. Isabella Massey (London, 1952-57), 3:368, 
385. With respect to the "misunderstanding" itself, he wrote on p. 382 of the same 
volume, "It is, moreover, obvious that he [Lichnowsky] can hardly have misunderstood 
first Tyrrell and then Grey, who over the telephone had put the direct question." 1 Edward Corp, "Sir William Tyrrell: The Eminence Grise of the British Foreign 
Office, 1912-1915," Historical Journal 25, no. 3 (1982): 705. 
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"was a stage in the struggle between Grey's followers and the majority 
of the Cabinet and an attempt, born of necessity, to keep France out of 
the war in the event of the interventionists failing to carry the day."12 
Lutz, unfortunately, failed to explain himself further. Nevertheless, 
Grey's cabinet problems influenced his diplomacy significantly. The 
Grey-Lichnowsky exchanges should be viewed as a part of his effort to 
ameliorate the effects of a war he feared England would not enter. 
Furthermore, Grey so detested war that even after he was satisfied the 
cabinet would permit intervention, he attempted to pressure France 
into taking steps that would prevent the war. 
Grey's attempts to mediate between the powers in the wake of the 
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28 have been ably 
treated elsewhere.13 Suffice it to say that Grey only brought the matter 
to the attention of the cabinet on July 23, after his peaceful overtures 
fell on deaf ears and the crisis deepened with Austria's ultimatum to 
Serbia. At the meeting of Monday, July 27, he received no clear man- 
date for action from his colleagues. Finding himself thus constrained, 
Grey deftly turned necessity into virtue and over the next few days 
stressed England's "free hand" in an attempt to strengthen pacific 
councils in Berlin and Paris. 
Austria's declaration of war on Serbia reached the Foreign Office 
the evening of July 28. The next afternoon, Grey again pressed the 
cabinet for a declaration of support for France, but that body ad- 
journed without taking a stand. The cabinet had "decided not to de- 
cide" as John Burns recorded in his diary.'4 Grey, therefore, used 
England's uncertain position to best advantage by telling the French 
and the Germans exactly what they did not want to hear. After discuss- 
ing the European situation with Lichnowsky that afternoon, Grey 
warned him that he should not be misled by their cordial conversation 
into believing that England could stand aloof, should France and Ger- 
many enter the conflict. In his dispatch to Sir Edward Goschen, his 
ambassador in Berlin, Grey wrote that he had told Lichnowsky, "If 
Germany became involved in it [war], and then France, the issue might 
be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not 
wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation-which 
I hoped would continue-into thinking that we should stand aside." 15 
12 Hermann Lutz, Lord Grey und der Weltkrieg (Berlin, 1927), cited here in Lord 
Grey and the World War, trans. E. W. Dickes (London, 1928), p. 296. 
13 For example, see Hinsley, ed. (n. 1 above). The "misunderstanding" of August 1, 
is not mentioned in any of the essays. 
14 Burns Diary, July 29, 1914, British Library Additional MS 46336. 15 Grey to Goschen, July 29, 1914, BD11, no. 286, pp. 182-83. 
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That morning, Grey had told French Ambassador Paul Cambon 
what the gist of his talk with Lichnowsky would be, with one major 
alteration. Lest the French act on the assumption of English support, 
Grey insisted that, "if Germany became involved and France became 
involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a 
case we should have to consider. France would then be drawn into a 
quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her 
honor and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engage- 
ments, and we should have to decide what British interests required us 
to do."16 Grey thus attempted to force Berlin and Paris to consider the 
prospect of a general war in the worst possible light: for France a war 
without, and for Germany a war against, Britain. 
On the morning of July 30, Grey could believe that Berlin had 
provided him ammunition for his battle in the cabinet. Goschen had 
telegraphed that German Chancellor Theobold von Bethmann- 
Hollweg had intimated that, if England maintained its neutrality, Ger- 
many would guarantee the postwar integrity of Belgium and France. 
This pledge of "self-restraint" did not include the French colonies. 
Furthermore, Germany would respect the neutrality and integrity of 
Holland, so long as Germany's enemies did likewise. Goschen con- 
tinued: "As regards Belgium, his Excellency could not tell to what 
operations Germany might be forced by the action of France, but he 
could state that, provided that Belgium did not take sides against Ger- 
many, her integrity would be respected after the conclusion of the 
war." 17 After reading this telegram, Assistant Under Secretary of State 
Sir Eyre Crowe noted in a minute that "it is of interest to note that 
Germany practically admits the intention to violate Belgian neu- 
trality."18 The German suggestion that England acquiesce in the inva- 
sion of Belgium, as well as in the eventual seizure of French colonies, 
provoked Grey to "a white heat of passion.""' He convinced Prime 
Minister Herbert Asquith to sanction an immediate rejection of this 
proposal. The cabinet approved this course the next day.20 
But even after this evidence of German intentions, the cabinet 
refused to take a firm line with Berlin. It only agreed that "British 
opinion would not enable us to support France-a violation of Belgium 
might alter public opinion, but we could say nothing to commit our- 
16 Grey to Bertie, July 29, 1914, BD11, no. 283, p. 180. 
17 Goschen to Grey, July 29, 1914, BD11, no. 293, pp. 185-86. 18 Ibid. 
19 Quoted in Hazlehurst (n. 1 above), p. 81. 
20 Grey to Goschen, July 30, 1914, BD11, no. 303, pp. 193-94. Sir Edward Grey 
(Viscount Grey of Fallodon), Twenty-Five Years, 2 vols. (New York, 1925), 1:329. 
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selves."21 In spite of the cabinet's caution, Grey, on July 31, "took a 
diplomatic step that contemplated the contingency of war."22 He asked 
Paris and Berlin whether or not they would respect the neutrality of 
Belgium provided that all other powers did likewise. Given the German 
proposal of the day before, he could expect an ambiguous response 
from Berlin. 
Meanwhile, Grey continued to disappoint the German and French 
ambassadors in private interviews. Before the cabinet met on July 31, 
Lichnowsky had again heard that "if France became involved we 
[England] should be drawn in."23 Cambon had also received discourag- 
ing news. Grey denied that there was any connection between the 
present situation and the Agadir crisis of 1911 when Britain had sup- 
ported France against Germany. He contended that "in this case 
France is being drawn into a dispute which is not hers."24 He also 
denied the charge that Britain's attitude had encouraged German 
militarists and pointed out he had told Lichnowsky that England would 
be drawn into a Franco-German war. But Cambon could take no com- 
fort in this assertion because Grey subsequently qualified it. As Grey 
explained in a telegram to Sir Francis Bertie, his offer, "of course, was 
not the same thing as a definite engagement to France, and I told M. 
Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the 
impression we would stand aside." When told Britain "cannot under- 
take a definite pledge to intervene in a war," Cambon begged Grey to 
reconsider. Grey replied that the cabinet would reconsider the situa- 
tion in the event of new developments but could give no pledge at that 
moment.25 
Word of Russia's general mobilization reached London at approxi- 
mately five o'clock on July 31.26 At midnight, the German embassy sent 
a note to the Foreign Office that concluded that the Russian action 
"affected Germany, whose mediation had been solicited by the Tsar 
personally. We were compelled, unless we wished to abandon the 
safety of the Fatherland, to answer this action, which could only be 
regarded as hostile, with serious counter-measures. We could not idly 
watch Russia mobilizing on our frontier. We therefore told Russia that 
21 Quoted in Hazlehurst, p. 84. 
22 Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1:329. 
23 Grey to Goschen, July 31, 1914, BD11, no. 340, pp. 215-16. 
24 Grey to Bertie, July 31, 1914, BD11, no. 352, p. 220. 
25 Ibid., no. 367, pp. 226-27. 
26 Buchanan to Grey, July 30, 1914, BD 11, no. 347, p. 218. This telegram arrived at 
5:20 P.M. on July 31. See the note added to the document that corrects the date the 
telegram was sent. Asquith announced news of the mobilization to the House of Com- 
mons at about five o'clock. 
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if she did not stop her warlike measures against Germany and Austria- 
Hungary within twelve hours, we should mobilize, and that would 
mean war [emphasis added]. We asked France whether in a Russo- 
German war she would remain neutral."27 The German note prompted 
Asquith to draft for King George a message which begged the Tsar "to 
leave still open grounds for negotiation and possible peace."28 
Other dispatches flooded the Foreign Office in the early morning 
of August 1, confirming the drift toward war. News of Belgian mobili- 
zation reached the Foreign Office at 12:35 A.M.29 Less than three hours 
later, Sir Francis Bertie, the British ambassador in Paris, reported 
France's resolve to respect Belgian neutrality; France would act other- 
wise only as a defensive measure, given prior violation by "some other 
power."30 Yet Goschen wired from Berlin that Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs Gottlieb von Jagow "gave me to understand he rather 
doubted whether they could answer at all [regarding German respect of 
Belgian borders], as any reply they might give could not fail, in the 
event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing to a certain 
extent part of their plan of campaign."31 At 8:00 A.M. the Foreign Office 
received still more electrifying news: "Vice-consul at Belgrade tele- 
phones town being bombarded and shells falling around British Lega- 
tion."32 Hostilities had commenced; barring quick action, war would 
soon spread to Russia, Germany, and France. What could Grey do to 
prevent war while at the same time preparing the cabinet for possible 
intervention? 
Obviously, Grey's crucial battle would be waged within the 
cabinet. But what diplomatic options remained open to him? Through- 
out much of the day, Grey still thought in terms of avoiding a general 
war; as late as 3:10 P.M., he telegraphed to Goschen that "I still believe 
that if only a little respite in time can be gained before any Great Power 
begins war [emphasis added] it might be possible to secure peace."33 
At this juncture, Grey believed he could do no more to influence Ber- 
lin. For three days, the Kaiser had been receiving the threat-as yet 
empty-of English participation in a Franco-German war. Grey could 
say nothing more to deter Germany. 
Thus, in appraising the situation on the morning of August 1, Grey 
27 BDll, July 31, 1914, no. 372, pp. 229-30. 
28 Grey to Buchanan, August 1, 1914, BD11, no. 384, pp. 235-36. See also Herbert 
Asquith, Moments of Memory: Recollections and Impressions (London, 1937), p. 198. 
29 Villiers to Grey, July 31, 1914, BD11, no. 377, p. 233. 
30 Bertie to Grey, July 31, 1914, BD11, no. 382, p. 234. 
31 Goschen to Grey, July 31, 1914, BD1l, no. 383, pp. 234-35. 
32 Crackanthorpe to Grey, July 30, 1914, BD 11, no. 388, p. 237. 
33 Grey to Goschen, August 1, 1914, BDll, no. 411, p. 246. 
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worked under the assumptions that, with war imminent, (1) he could 
not dissuade Berlin and (2) the cabinet would not sanction intervention 
on behalf of France. This disagreeable situation demanded drastic ac- 
tion, lest the Germans defeat the French as they had in 1870-71. At 
11:14 A.M., Lichnowsky cabled that "Sir Edward Grey has just sent 
word to me by Sir W. Tyrrell that he hopes that he will be able this 
afternoon, as a result of a council of ministers [Ministerberatung] that 
is just taking place, to make a statement to me which may prove helpful 
in preventing the great catastrophe. To judge by a remark of Sir W. 
Tyrrell's, this seems to mean that in the event of our not attacking 
France, England too, would remain neutral and would guarantee 
France's passivity. I shall learn the details this afternoon."34 
What was Grey doing? Without the sanction of the cabinet, let 
alone the French, he was apparently offering Anglo-French neutrality 
to Germany. But under what circumstances? Both Grey and Lich- 
nowsky subsequently maintained that Lichnowsky had missed Grey's 
proposal that Germany should attack neither France nor Russia. Given 
the context of the exchange, however, this argument is unconvincing. 
At that moment, Austria and Serbia were at war, Russia's partial 
mobilization had become general, and Germany threatened its own 
mobilization, which meant war unless Russia cancelled its mobiliza- 
tion. Those endorsing the "misunderstanding thesis" rest their case on 
the dubious assumption that Grey was asking Germany to stand aside 
and watch Russia crush Berlin's Austro-Hungarian ally. The Kaiser 
could not be expected to take such a proposal seriously. On these 
grounds alone, let alone on those to be discussed below, it is evident 
that Grey actually proposed Anglo-French neutrality in a Russo- 
German war to Lichnowsky. 
Grey fully realized the magnitude of his action, and he may well 
have sought the advice of his closest friends; he apparently met with 
Asquith and Lord Chancellor Haldane at 10:30 A.M., half an hour be- 
fore the cabinet met.35 No minutes of this meeting exist, but it is likely 
Grey's colleagues advised him to be absolutely sure of such a step 
34 Lichnowsky to Jagow, August 1, 1914, DD3, no. 562, p. 66. 
35 See Young (n. 4 above), p. 657. He noted that the strongest evidence that they met 
"is provided by Lichnowsky whose cable of 11:14 a.m. reported that the proposal Tyrrell 
had just vaguely indicated to him would issue from a ministerial consultation 
[Ministerberatung] which was taking place at that moment. After Tyrrell left him, as the 
prince reported further in his cable, Grey called him by telephone and said that he would 
make use of the prince's assurance with regard to France in 'today's cabinet meeting,' an 
obviously different gathering from the one taking place when Tyrrell first came to the 
German embassy." Haldane also mentioned this meeting in a letter to his mother. See 
Hazelhurst (n. 1 above), p. 90. 
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before he presented it to the cabinet. Just prior to the cabinet meet- 
ing, Grey telephoned the German ambassador to ask "whether I 
[Lichnowsky] thought I could give an assurance that in the event of 
France remaining neutral in a war between Russia and Germany we 
should not attack the French. I assured him that I could take the 
responsibility for such a guarantee and he will use this assurance at 
today's Cabinet meeting." 36 Though sent in one telegram at 11:14 A.M., 
Lichnowsky's dispatch mentioned two different communications with 
Grey: Tyrrell's mission and Grey's phone call. Significantly, in this 
second exchange, Lichnowsky made explicit reference to French neu- 
trality during a Russo-German war, which obviously contradicts the 
"misunderstanding" thesis. When reduced to its essentials, this narra- 
tive indicates that Grey, in return for guaranteeing French neutrality, 
received an assurance that Germany would not attack France in a 
Russo-German war. In other words, Grey suggested that France and 
England would stand aside and view the defeat of Serbia and Russia. 
Albertini commented that the kaiser, the chancellor, and their advisors 
at the Schloss were so blinded with elation that they "never stopped to 
ask themselves whether they were dreaming or whether Grey had gone 
crazy." 
It may be regarded as certain that on the morning of 1 August Grey really 
believed in the possibility of promising Germany that France and England 
would remain neutral. The idea was in every sense absurd. It was incon- 
ceivable that France would betray her ally and leave her at the mercy of 
Austria and Germany, while it was easy to foresee that, once victory in 
the east had been gained, Germany would turn her strength against 
France.... Once France had been beaten the same fate would sooner or 
later have overtaken Britain. It seems impossible that Grey can ever have 
entertained such an idea. And yet he did so.37 
In these comments, however, Albertini failed to consider Grey's posi- 
tion vis-a-vis the cabinet. When Grey sent Tyrrell on his errand and 
when he called Lichnowsky just before 11:00 A.M., he had to assume 
that the cabinet would not sanction intervention. Given this scenario, 
Grey would be forced to inform Paris that England definitely would not 
intervene in a Balkan quarrel. Salvaging something from the situation, 
he could, at least, offer the French Lichnowsky's guarantee that Ger- 
many would not attack if France remained neutral. Paris, no doubt 
ringing with cries of "Perfide Albion," would then face two dis- 
36 Lichnowsky to Jagow, August 1, 1914, DD3, no. 562, p. 66. 
37 Albertini (n. 10 above), 3:381, 382-83. 
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agreeable choices: to fight and risk probable defeat, or to abandon 
Russia and remain neutral. Grey could hope that the French would be 
rational and choose the second option. Given the lack of Anglo-French 
support, Russia would then presumably have to avoid war with Ger- 
many and Austria. The result would be Austria's crushing of Serbia 
and the disruption of both the Anglo-French Entente and the Franco- 
Russian Alliance, but no general war. Germany and the Central Powers 
would have won a significant victory. However, Grey could believe 
that this was not too high a price to pay, given that the alternative 
would be the probable establishment of German continental hegemony 
while England remained idle. 
With Lichnowsky's word in his pocket, Grey faced the cabinet. 
During the meeting, Winston Churchill was denied permission to 
mobilize the navy. The cabinet also decided that it still could not pro- 
pose that Parliament send an expeditionary force to the continent.38 
But Grey, faced with the apparent realization of his worst fears of 
enforced neutrality, did not choose to make use of Lichnowsky's 
pledge, nor, for that matter, did he reveal that he had even talked with 
the German ambassador that morning. Why not? 
Belgium provides the only plausible answer. The cabinet did give 
Grey permission to tell Lichnowsky that, "if there were a violation of 
the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected 
it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this coun- 
try."39 Though Grey that evening said that he would have to have a 
"tussle" with the cabinet the next day, one must conclude that he 
believed this statement to be a decisive step toward intervention in the 
impending war. It is otherwise difficult to account for Grey's failure to 
mention Lichnowsky's pledge to his colleagues. 
However, Grey saw quite well that there yet remained a chance 
that his plan for intervention would not work. The cabinet adjourned at 
around 1:30 P.M. At 2:10 P.M., Lichnowsky cabled Berlin that "Sir 
William Tyrrell has just been to see me and told me that Sir Edward 
Grey wants this afternoon to make proposals for England's neutrality, 
even in the event of our being at war with France as well as Russia. I 
shall see Sir Edward at 3:30 and shall report at once."40 Whereas 
previously Grey had spoken of French neutrality, his scenario now 
included France in a continental war. Why the change? Grey realized 
that the key to British intervention was Belgium, and that it could still 
38 Grey to Bertie, August 1, 1914, BD11, no. 426, p. 253. 
39 Grey to Goschen, August 1, 1914, BD1, no. 448, pp. 260-61. 
40 Lichnowsky to Jagow, August 1, 1914, DD3, no. 570, p. 70. 
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fail him in either of two instances: (1) German respect for Belgian 
neutrality or (2) a lack of Belgian resistance to German invasion. By 
August 1, if not earlier, a German attack on France through Belgium 
seemed probable.41 But would the Belgians actively defend them- 
selves? Grey's "tussle" in the cabinet would be difficult indeed if he 
sought to send British soldiers to die for the honor of Belgium while 
Belgian soldiers remained mere neutral observers or offered only token 
resistance. 
So long as the ultimate Belgian response remained uncertain, Grey 
still had to plan for any eventuality. The proposal made to Lichnowsky 
after the cabinet meeting left the door open for Britain and Grey to 
salvage something from the debacle caused if Belgium allowed German 
troops passage through the country. In that event, Grey might yet 
wring concessions from a Germany still eager to buy British neutrality, 
even if he had to accept a deal along the lines of Bethmann-Hollweg's 
offer of July 30. 
Fortunately for Grey, the Belgians were resolute. Grey probably 
had a good impression of Brussels's intentions when the cabinet met, 
for, as noted above, the Foreign Office had received word of Belgium's 
general mobilization at 12:35 A.M. that morning. However, Grey re- 
ceived "encouraging if not conclusive" news from Sir Francis Villiers, 
the British ambassador at Brussels, when he had a chance to review 
information received while the cabinet met.42 In a telegram that arrived 
at 12:25 P.M., Villiers reported that the Belgian minister of foreign 
affairs stated "that Belgium will to the utmost of her power maintain 
neutrality, and desires and expects other powers to observe and up- 
hold it. 
"He begged me to add that the relations between Belgium and the 
neighboring Powers were excellent and that there was no reason to 
suspect their intentions, but that [the] Belgian Government believed 
that in case of [a] violation they were in a position to defend the 
neutrality of their country."43 Finally, as if he needed any further 
confirmation of German intentions, at 3:00 P.M. Grey received word 
from Goschen in Berlin that the "Military Attache [is] confident [that] 
in [the] event of war Germany will pass part of her forces through 
Belgium."44 Thus before he met with Lichnowsky, the fears that had 
motivated both of Tyrrell's informal missions had been dispelled: the 
41 Herbert Louis Samuel, Memoirs (London, 1945), p. 101. 42 Hazlehurst, p. 99. 
43 Villiers to Grey, August 1, 1914, BDll, no. 395, p. 240. 
44 Goschen to Grey, August 1, 1914, BDll, no. 404, p. 243. 
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cabinet had moved toward a commitment to Belgium, and the Belgians 
had indicated that they would defend themselves against a German 
invasion. Grey could now anticipate British participation in a Euro- 
pean war. 
Grey could not have looked forward to his 3:30 P.M. meeting with 
Lichnowsky. He had, of course, made no firm offer to Germany, yet he 
did face the ticklish task of dismantling his own initiatives. In a summa- 
tion to Berlin of the day's exchanges as well as of his 3:30 meeting with 
Grey, Lichnowsky telegraphed Berlin: 
He [Grey] had been wondering whether it would not be possible for us and 
France in the event of a Russian war to remain facing each other without 
either side attacking. I asked him whether he was in a position to give me 
an assurance that France would agree to a pact of that sort. Since we 
intended neither to destroy France nor to annex parts of her territory, I 
could imagine that we might enter on an agreement of that sort since it 
would assure us of Great Britain's neutrality. The minister said that he 
would enquire, but was not blind to the difficulties of restraining two 
armies and keeping them in a state of inactivity.45 
Grey thus not only backed away from his earliest offer of French 
passivity but revealed that he had made it without having consulted the 
French. His answer also sheds light on another aspect of the alleged 
"misunderstanding" of August 1. Lichnowsky here specifically asked 
about the possibility of French neutrality during a Russo-German war, 
in exact accord with his telegram of 11:14 A.M., and Grey's only reply 
was a weak intimation that it might prove impossible to restrain two 
mobilized armies while Germany attacked Russia; thus when offered a 
perfect opportunity to tell Lichnowsky that he had misunderstood the 
conditions under which he had earlier proposed Anglo-French neu- 
trality, Grey did not do so. No misunderstanding had occurred. 
At the 3:30 P.M. meeting, Lichnowsky of course did not receive the 
proposals for England's neutrality during a German war with the 
Franco-Russian Alliance that Tyrrell had suggested in his second trip 
to the German Embassy. Rather, Grey made a statement of conditions 
under which the British might intervene. The violation of Belgian neu- 
trality of course headed the list. The German ambassador remained 
calm in spite of this discouraging turn of events. He asked whether 
Grey could give a definite assurance of British neutrality if Germany 
agreed to respect Belgium's borders. Young wrote that "this clever 
45 Lichnowsky to Jagow, August 1, 1914, DD3, no. 596, pp. 89-91. 
416 VALONE 
SIR EDWARD GREY'S DIPLOMACY 
question, consistent with the search for a means to assure military 
passivity in the West, caught Grey unawares."46 But this question 
undoubtedly embarrassed Grey more than it surprised him. Lich- 
nowsky had exposed Grey's weakest point: to intervene, Grey needed 
Belgian resistance to a German invasion because the cabinet had 
shown no inclination to fight for France, let alone Serbia and Russia. 
Grey could not make such a statement since the Germans might accept 
the offer, spare Belgium, and thus doom his attempt to trigger English 
intervention. He could only reply that a violation of Belgium would 
greatly affect public opinion and make it "very difficult for the Govern- 
ment to adopt a benevolent neutrality."47 
Lichnowsky concluded his telegram by stating the general impres- 
sion that "people here would like, if at all possible, to keep out of the 
war" but that the lack of a pledge to respect Belgium had made a "very 
unfavorable impression."48 The German ambassador, for all intents 
and purposes, considered Grey's earlier intimations no longer valid 
and the affair closed.49 However, owing to the time lag involved in 
communication between London and Berlin, the kaiser cabled accep- 
tance to the first Lichnowsky telegram early that evening, which would 
cause Grey acute embarrassment. 
Grey had dealt with Lichnowsky as tactfully as possible.50 He no 
longer harbored significant doubts that England would intervene, but 
having found the means to secure involvement in a European war, 
Grey so wished to avoid bloodshed that he made one last effort to keep 
the peace. In a series of remarkable, if overlooked, communications 
with French Ambassador Paul Cambon as well as to his ambassador in 
Paris, Sir Francis Bertie, Grey attempted to bludgeon France into neu- 
tality and thus either localize or prevent the war. Bertie, in his diary 
entry of July 29, provided a clue as to Grey's probable line of thought: 
"The French should put pressure on the Russian Government to mod- 
erate their zeal. If we gave an assurance of armed assistance to France 
and Russia now, Russia would become more exacting and France 
46 Harry Young, Prince Lichnowsky and the Great War (Savannah, Ga., 1977), 
p. 117. 
47 Lichnowsky to Jagow, August 1, 1914, DD3, no. 596, pp. 89-91. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Albertini (n. 10 above), 3:386. 
50 In his memoirs, perhaps as an apology to Lichnowsky for the trouble he had 
caused him, Grey wrote, "Do his [Lichnowsky's] countrymen yet recognize, not only 
how clear he was of any responsibility, but the debt that is owed him for his efforts for 
peace during the whole of his Embassy in London? We, at any rate, remember him 
gratefully for having tried to avert a war that has been a calamity for everyone, victors as 
well as vanquished." See Grey (n. 20 above), 2:233. 
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would have to follow in her wake." 5 But by the afternoon of August 1, 
the French had not managed to moderate the Russians, and Grey knew 
that England, too, would follow the Russian wake into war. Grey now 
took Bertie's thoughts one step further: England would pressure 
France into pressuring Russia. 
For their part, the French had frantically attempted, but failed, to 
find a way to earn a firm pledge of English support. The French govern- 
ment had given a quick and affirmative reply to London's request for a 
guarantee of Belgian neutrality.52 French soldiers had withdrawn ten 
kilometers from the German frontier to avoid giving even the appear- 
ance of provocation.53 Finally, the French Embassy received instruc- 
tions to draw Grey's attention to the Italian declaration that the present 
war was not defensive and that for this reason the casusfoederis under 
the terms of the Triple Alliance did not arise.54 The French had done all 
that prudence dictated and, if nothing else, Paris could hardly expect 
criticism for having drawn Britain into an aggressive war. But Grey 
perceived that French caution alone was insufficient to act as a mod- 
erating influence on St. Petersburg and that stronger measures were 
necessary. 
He apparently began this campaign during the 10:30 A.M. meeting 
with Asquith and Haldane. Lt. General Sir Henry Wilson, the director 
of military operations and an ardent supporter for intervention on be- 
half of France, subsequently noted with disgust in his diary that "at 
11:30 a.m. 'Squiff [Asquith] wrote to C.I.G.S. ... 'putting on record' 
that the Govt had never promised the French the E[xpeditionary] 
F[orce]!!" 55 Hazlehurst concluded that Asquith's intentions regarding 
this letter are impenetrable: "What is most difficult to understand is 
why Asquith should have sent such a message to the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff before a cabinet decision had been taken."56 
Asquith's intentions become clearer if one considers the letter as part 
51 Lady Algernon Gordon Lennox, ed., The Diary of Lord Bertie, 1914-1918 (New 
York, 1924), p. 5. There are other similarities between the thoughts of the two men. That 
same day Bertie also wrote that "People, however, do not realize, or do not take into 
account, the difficulty for the British Government to declare England solidaire with 
Russia and France in a question such as the Austro-Servian [sic] quarrel." On August 2 
he prophesied, "The war will not be over soon. What carnage and suffering, and how 
disgusting the cause!" See Lennox, pp. 5, 9. 
52 Bertie to Grey, August 1, 1914, BD1l, no. 382, p. 234. 
53 Bertie to Grey, August 1, 1914, BD11, no. 403, p. 243. 
54 August 1, 1914, BD11, no. 406, p. 244. 
55 Quoted in Hazlehurst (n. 1 above), p. 90. Note that Wilson apparently meant that 
the letter arrived at 11:30 because Asquith presided over the cabinet from 11:00 A.M. to 
1:30 P.M. 
56 Ibid. 
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of Grey's effort to preserve peace by declaring that no formal obliga- 
tion bound England to aid France. Wilson advocated cooperation with 
the French and favored a declaration of support for the entente. He 
was also in close contact with the French embassy57 and could be 
expected to convey the contents of the letter to the French, thus serv- 
ing Grey's efforts to moderate French and Russian zeal. 
In his first dispatch to Bertie after his talk with Lichnowsky, Grey 
continued to apply pressure: "I have definitely refused all overtures to 
give Germany any promise of neutrality, and shall not entertain any 
such suggestions unless it were on conditions that secured real advan- 
tages for France."58 "German Ambassador here seemed to think it not 
impossible, when I suggested it [emphasis added], that after mobiliza- 
tion on western frontier French and German armies should remain, 
neither crossing the frontier as long as the other did not do so. I cannot 
say whether this would be consistent with French obligations under her 
alliance. If it were so consistent, I suppose French Government would 
not object to our engaging to be neutral as long as German army re- 
mained on frontier on the defensive."59 Grey summarized for Bertie 
the gist of his 11:14 A.M. exchange with Lichnowsky. However, this 
was disingenuous because he had just told Lichnowsky that Franco- 
German passivity would not work because of "the difficulties of re- 
straining the two armies and keeping them in a state of inactivity."60 
But here Grey implied to Bertie that military passivity in the West 
could be advantageous to France. This was surely not the sort of 
statement those in Paris, counting on British support, wanted to hear. 
Grey's handwritten draft of this telegram also contains clues to 
what happened on August 1 that are not available to those relying on 
the text provided in British Documents on the Origins of the War. Grey 
at first began his draft with the word "I," which was stricken out and 
for which was substituted the word "We."61 The records of the Paris 
embassy reveal that this correction was made in the official telegram 
sent to Bertie.62 While this is only a minor point, Grey's original word- 
ing, which was accidentally used in British Documents (cited hereafter 
57 Ekstein and Steiner, in Hinsley, ed. (n. 1 above), p. 405. 
58 In the Paris embassy copy of this telegram, the word is "secured," not 
"seemed," as is recorded in BD 11. See PRO, FO 146/4411. In Grey's original draft, it is 
unclear whether he wrote "seemed" or "secured." See PRO, FO 371/2160. I have used 
"secured" because it was used in the embassy copy and makes more sense grammati- 
cally. 
59 Grey to Bertie, August 1, 1914, BD11, no. 419, p. 250. 60 Lichnowsky to Jagow, August 1, 1914, DD3, no. 596, pp. 89-91. 61 See PRO, FO 371/2160. 
62 See PRO, FO 146/4411. 
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as BD), reflected accurately the extent to which British diplomacy on 
that day was his work alone. This slip on Grey's part supports the 
interpretation that the principal permanent officials in the Foreign 
Office, Sir Eyre Crowe and Sir Arthur Nicholson, both of whom 
strenuously urged support for France, had little influence on Grey 
during the crisis.63 
Grey's draft contains yet another, much more important, piece of 
evidence. Historians have previously noted the significance of Grey's 
admission, "when I suggested it," with respect to the prospect of 
Franco-German neutrality and used it against proponents of the "mis- 
understanding thesis." In Grey's draft the words, "when I suggested 
it," were inserted into the original text.64 Thus, this statement was not 
unconsciously or mistakenly put into the dispatch; Grey wrote the 
note, realized that, as written, it appeared that the proposal for Franco- 
German passivity was Lichnowsky's, and added the words "when I 
suggested it" to correct this impression. 
At 8:20 P.M., Grey telegraphed to Bertie an account of his after- 
noon interview with Cambon. He now presented the scenario por- 
trayed in the previous telegram much more forcefully: 
After the Cabinet to-day, I told M. Cambon that the present position 
differed entirely from that created by the Morocco incidents. In the latter, 
Germany made upon France demands that France could not grant, and in 
connection with which we had undertaken special obligations towards 
France. In these, public opinion would have justified the British Govern- 
ment in supporting France to the utmost of their ability. Now, the position 
was that Germany would agree not to attack France if France remained 
neutral in the event of war between Russia and Germany [emphasis 
added]. If France could not take advantage of this position, it was because 
she was bound by an alliance to which we were not parties, and of which 
we did not know the terms. This did not mean that under no circum- 
stances would we assist France, but it did mean that France must take her 
own decision at this moment without reckoning on an assistance that we 
were not now in a position to promise.65 
Bluntly stated, Britain could offer to spare France an invasion, and if 
Paris could not accept the offer because of the alliance with Russia, 
63 Ekstein and Steiner wrote that, "Grey made his own policy during these July 
days. At the start he did not consult his officials; as the crisis developed, he often 
disregarded their advice." See Ekstein and Steiner, "The Sarajevo Crisis" in Hinsley, 
ed., p. 409. 64 See PRO, FO 371/2160. 
65 Grey to Bertie, August 1, 1914, BD11, no. 426, p. 253. 
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France would have to act without a promise of English support. Cam- 
bon replied that he could not transmit such a statement to Paris; he was 
so shaken that he asked for authorization to say, instead, that the 
cabinet had not yet taken any decision-in other words, to convey the 
same message which he had protested against so strongly just the day 
before. Grey was adamant: "I said we had come to a decision: that we 
could not propose to Parliament at this moment to send an expedi- 
tionary military force to the continent. Such a step had always been 
regarded here as very dangerous and doubtful. It was one that we could 
not propose, and Parliament would not authorise unless our interests 
and obligations were deeply and desperately involved."66 He would 
only admit that a German violation of Belgium or an attack on the 
French coasts by the German fleet "might alter public feeling" and that 
Cambon could report that the cabinet had not yet made a decision on 
these points. 
But would such a forceful statement lead to French pressure on 
the Russians for peace? Grey had certainly gotten his point across to 
Cambon. Harold Nicolson related in his biography of his father that, 
after this conversation, "white and speechless, he [Cambon] staggered 
into Nicolson's room. Nicolson went towards him and took his hands 
to guide him to a chair. 'Ils vont nous lacher, ils vont nous lacher,' was 
all that the Ambassador could say. Nicholson went upstairs to inter- 
view Sir Edward Grey. He found him pacing his room, biting at his 
lower lip. Nicolson asked whether it was indeed true that we had 
refused to support France at the moment of her greatest danger. Grey 
made no answer beyond a gesture of despair. 'You will render us,' 
Nicholson said angrily, 'a by-word among nations.'"67 
Bertie was similarly affected. On August 2, in despair over En- 
gland's apparent inaction, he confided in his diary, "It will not be long 
now before it is 'Perfide Albion.'" Marked "later," under the same 
day, he lamented, "I have been feeling so sick at heart, and ashamed, 
that 'Perfide Albion' should really be applicable. I suppose the hope is 
that the French will win without us, but if they do, and that is doubtful, 
we should not receive much consideration in the Treaty of Peace at the 
end of the war; and if the Germans be the conquerers what will be our 
fate?" 68 
66 Ibid. 
67 Harold Nicolson, Sir Arthur Nicolson, Bart., First Lord Carnock (London, 1930), 
p. 419. Grey wrote in his memoirs that "the interviews with Cambon were distressing to 
both of us, but must have been even more so to him than to me. The very existence of his 
country as a great nation was at stake, and it was vital to France to know what Britain 
would do." See Grey (n. 2 above), 1:339. 
68 Lennox, p. 8. 
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He need not have worried. After his 8:20 P.M. telegram to Paris, 
Grey never again placed such extreme pressure on France. But why 
did he abandon the course he had steadfastly pursued throughout the 
day? The turning point for Grey occurred shortly after he sent this 
telegram to Bertie, when the kaiser's acceptance of Grey's "proposal" 
of French passivity arrived in London. Those unaware of Grey's ma- 
neuvers, quite possibly everyone in the Foreign Office except for Tyr- 
rell, could only be shocked to learn that the kaiser had "just received 
the communication from your Government offering French neutrality 
under guarantee of Great Britain."69 
Grey received word to present himself at Buckingham Palace to 
explain the kaiser's telegram and draft a reply. Sometime between 8:30 
and 9:30 P.M., he penciled that "there must be some misunderstanding 
as to a suggestion that passed in friendly conversation between Prince 
Lichnowsky and Sir Edward Grey this afternoon."70 Thus the birth of 
the myth that has since puzzled scholars. King George's reply flogged 
again the dead horse of Franco-German neutrality that both Grey and 
Lichnowsky considered buried after their 3:30 P.M. meeting. But Berlin 
did not receive word of the results of that meeting until 10:02 P.M., 
hours after the kaiser sent his telegram to London. 
The meeting with the king meant the end of Grey's hope of 
avoiding war by pressuring France into neutrality. He realized that 
once he had to reject openly the idea of Franco-German neutrality, he 
could no longer use it as a means to influence French diplomacy. 
Although Grey had failed to secure peace, Belgium's resolve to defend 
its neutrality allowed Grey to take some comfort. England ultimately 
would not abandon France. 
Historians have ignored the evidence that suggests that the king's 
telegram to the kaiser marked a turning point for Grey's diplomacy. 
The minutes under the 3:30 A.M. telegram of 1 August, whereby the 
German government refused to guarantee Belgian neutrality, contain 
the notation: "Repeat to Paris (no. 300 Aug 1, 9:45 p.m. [emphasis 
added])."7' The Foreign Office had held this information for over eigh- 
teen hours, apparently only forwarding it to Paris on Grey's return 
from his audience with the king. Was this mere inefficiency or coinci- 
dence? It seems unlikely. Almost concurrently with this telegram (BD 
69 Kaiser Wilhelm to King George, August 1, 1914, DD3, no. 575, pp. 74-75. Fur- 
thermore, word arrived soon after of Germany's declaration of war on Russia. Given that 
Grey had still hoped for peace "before any Great Power begins war," such news effec- 
tively ended all hope of avoiding war. Grey to Goschen, August 1, 1914, BD11, no. 411, 
p. 246. 
70 King George to Kaiser Wilhelm, August 1, 1914, DD3, no. 612, pp. 103-4. 
71 Goschen to Grey, July 31, 1914, BDll, no. 383, pp. 234-35. 
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no. 383), Goschen had sent another telegram to Grey (BD no. 385), 
which arrived fifteen minutes after the neutrality statement but which 
was repeated to Paris at 1:45 P.M., a full eight hours earlier.72 Grey, 
who had told Cambon of the important role played by Belgium with 
respect to British public opinion, with this telegram at last conveyed an 
encouraging message to Paris. 
Winston Churchill gave further testimony that Grey's diplomacy 
changed after the kaiser's telegram. When Churchill received word of 
Germany's declaration of war on Russia shortly after 9:30 P.M., he told 
Asquith of his intention to mobilize the fleet. Asquith did not disap- 
prove, and, as Churchill left, Grey told him: "You should know I have 
just done a very important thing. I have told Cambon that we shall not 
allow the German fleet to come into the Channel."73 Cambon fully 
realized the significance of this pledge. Though it is clear that he was, 
in fact, referring to the events of August 1, 1914, in a letter to his son on 
August 2, 1916, he wrote: "The day of 2 August 1914 is the one in 
which I spent the gravest moments of my life. It was only in the 
evening about ten p.m. that Grey sent to me the paper by which the 
British Government promised to protect our coasts. That sufficed to 
involve England against Germany. The next day, Belgian territory was 
violated and English intervention became obligatory to the eyes of the 
most recalcitrant."74 Grey's efforts to keep the peace thus ended on 
the evening of August 1. 
72 PRO, FO 146/4411. 
73 Quoted in Ted Morgan, Churchill: Young Man in a Hurry (New York, 1982), pp. 
393-94. 
74 Paul Cambon, Correspondance (Paris, 1940-46), vol. 3, pp. 119-20. In addition, 
note that the Germans invaded Belgium on August 4, not August 3, as Cambon wrote in 
the letter. The records contained in Documents Diplomatiques Francais (DDF) seem to 
support the contention that Cambon was referring to the events of August 1, 1914. In 
DDF no. 579, which was sent at 11:20 A.M. on August 2, Cambon wired that Grey had 
told him yesterday evening (hier soir) that "he will propose to the Cabinet to declare that 
the naval forces of England would prevent all operations against France." With respect 
to Cambon's dispatch the night of August 1, the editors of DDF noted that the documents 
were apparently mistimed. See no. 532, n. 1. In their subsequent explanation, the editors 
stated that Cambon's dispatches no. 171 and no. 172 (which comprise DDF no. 532) are 
similar to BD 11, no. 426, Grey to Bertie, 8:20 P.M. It is much more accurate to say that 
Cambon's no. 171 is so consistent because in this telegram Cambon did not mention 
Grey's offering any support to France or Belgium. In no. 172, Cambon reported that 
Grey "will demand authorization to declare Monday to the House of Commons that the 
Government of Britain will not permit a violation of Belgium" and that the British fleets 
"will oppose passage into the English Channel by the German fleets, or if they have 
already passed, any demonstration against the French coasts." These declarations of 
British support are completely different from Grey's message to Bertie at 8:20 P.M. 
Finally, insofar as the actual timing of telegram no. 172 is concerned, Cambon reported, 
"The English fleets are mobilized." Thus it would seem that no. 172 was written some- 
time after 9:30 P.M. on August 1. 
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Grey finally had his "tussle" with the cabinet on August 2. The 
letter of summation the cabinet sent to the King showed that Grey's 
assumption on August 1 about the future direction of the cabinet had 
been correct: "It was agreed, without any attempt to state a formula, 
that it would be made evident that a substantial violation of the neu- 
trality of that country [Belgium] would place us in the situation con- 
templated as possible by Mr. Gladstone in 1870, when interference was 
held to compel us to take action." 75 Hazlehurst wrote that this guarded 
formula indeed meant that "the point of no return had been 
reached."76 
At 4:00 P.M. on Monday, August 3, Grey addressed the House of 
Commons, which gave receptive cheers in support of a British defense 
of Belgium. At six o'clock "the Secretary of State was leaning gloom- 
ily by the window. Nicolson congratulated him on the success of his 
speech. Sir Edward did not answer. He moved to the center of the 
room and raised his hands with clenched fists above his head. He 
brought his fists with a crash upon the table. 'I hate war' he groaned 'I 
hate war.' "77 
Clearly there was no "misunderstanding" on August 1, 1914. 
Rather, historians have misunderstood Grey's attempt to make contin- 
gency plans through Lichnowsky in case a continental war found En- 
gland neutral. The mere fact that he had been forced to guard against 
such a situation must have been highly distasteful to Grey, who al- 
lowed the "misunderstanding" myth to cloak the affair. 
More important, within Sir Edward Grey on August 1, 1914, there 
struggled two absolute convictions: (1) that the unfolding situation 
must not result in a European war but (2) that, if it did, England must 
stand beside France and Russia. By his actions of that day, Grey gave 
precedence to the former, since he toiled for peace long after the 
cabinet had taken what he considered to be significant steps toward 
intervention. But Berlin dashed Grey's last efforts at peace with its 
retarded acceptance of the long-dead proposal of French neutrality. A 
European war and British intervention remained the only alternative.78 
75 Quoted in Hazlehurst (n. 1 above), p. 98. 76 Ibid. 
77 Nicolson, p. 422. The next day, in an interview with U.S. Ambassador Walter 
Hines Page, after saying, "Everybody knows that there will be war," Grey's eyes filled 
with tears and he concluded, "Thus the efforts of a lifetime go for nothing. I feel like a 
man who has wasted his life." From Burton Hendrick, Life and Letters of W. H. Page 
(New York, 1924), 1:313. 
78 Ekstein and Steiner conclude that, "While Grey led the Cabinet into war, he more 
than anyone had a horror of war and forebodings about its consequences. Britain's entry 
into war was both a victory and a defeat." See Hinsley, ed. (n. 1 above), p. 410. 
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